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Abstract
What generates persistence in in￿ ation? Is in￿ ation persistence structural?
This paper investigates learning as a potential source of persistence in in￿ ation. The paper focuses on the
price-setting problem of ￿rms and presents a model that nests structural sources of persistence (indexation)
and learning. Indexation is typically necessary under rational expectations to match the inertia in the data
and to improve the ￿t of estimated New Keynesian Phillips curves.
The empirical results show that when learning replaces the assumption of fully rational expectations,
structural sources of persistence in in￿ ation, such as indexation, become unsupported by the data. The
results suggest learning behavior as the main source of persistence in in￿ ation. This ￿nding has implications
for the optimal monetary policy.
The paper also shows how one￿ s results can heavily depend on the assumed learning speed. The estimated
persistence and the model ￿t, in fact, vary across the whole range of constant gain values. The paper derives
the best-￿tting constant gains in the sample and shows that the learning speed has substantially changed
over time.
Keywords: adaptive learning, in￿ation persistence, sticky prices, best-￿tting constant gain, learning speed, expectations.
JEL classi￿cation: D84, E30, E50.
￿I am grateful to Michael Woodford, John Faust, Michael Kiley, Athanasios Orphanides, Giorgio Primiceri, Chris
Sims, Lars Svensson, and Noah Williams for comments and helpful discussions. I would also like to thank participants
at seminars at Princeton University and the Federal Reserve Board. Remaining errors are my own. Address for
correspondence: Fabio Milani - Princeton University, Department of Economics, Fisher Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544-
1021. E-mail address: fmilani@princeton.edu; Homepage: www.princeton.edu/~fmilani.ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 1
1. INTRODUCTION
What creates persistence in in￿ ation? Is in￿ ation persistence a structural characteristic of
industrialized economies? Or does persistence instead vary with the monetary policy regime, for
example?
Despite several studies concerning in￿ ation dynamics, economists have not reached a consensus
about the answers to the previous questions. This paper aims to address some of those questions,
proposing and evaluating learning as a possible solution.
A vast literature uses sticky price models to describe in￿ ation behavior. The need to match
the sluggishness of price movements and to allow for some real e⁄ects of monetary policy led many
researchers to abandon the hypothesis of ￿ exible prices. Current dynamic general equilibrium
models often incorporate price stickiness and imperfect competition. These frameworks are built
from the optimizing choices of economic agents and are therefore theoretically appealing. By
incorporating various rigidities, they were also expected to be empirically more realistic.
But sticky price models still fail to imply realistic levels of in￿ ation persistence. In the baseline
New Keynesian model, at least, in￿ ation is in fact an entirely forward-looking variable and all of
its inertia is inherited from the inertia of an exogenous driving variable, i.e. real marginal costs or
the output gap. To improve the empirical ￿t of these models, it is necessary to extend them by
introducing additional sources of persistence. Those extensions allow researchers to introduce the
dependence of current in￿ ation on lagged in￿ation. The additional channels of inertia have been
variously modelled in the literature incorporating rule-of-thumb behavior, quadratic adjustment
costs or indexation to past in￿ ation. The impulse responses become more in line with those derived
from VAR models, implying adjustment delays and sluggish responses.
Gali￿and Gertler (1999), for example, allow for the existence of a fraction of ￿rms that deviate
from full rationality and set instead their prices using simple rule-of-thumbs. Christiano, Eichen-
baum and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003), Giannoni and Woodford (2003) and Woodford
(2003), on the other hand, allow partial or full indexation of prices to past in￿ ation rates for ￿rms
not adjusting their prices optimally in a given period, as an extension to the standard Calvo (1983)
pricing model. The implications are similar: current in￿ ation ceases to be a merely forward-looking
variable, now also depending on lagged in￿ ation. Those variations improve the empirical properties
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Indeed, it seems that in￿ ation can be well represented by a speci￿cation that nests both forward-
and backward-looking terms. But the relative importance of the two components is a matter of
dispute.
Gali￿and Gertler (1999) propose what they call the ￿New Hybrid Phillips Curve￿ , in which
real marginal costs are the main driving variable of in￿ ation, and both expected and past in￿ ation
a⁄ect the dynamics of current in￿ ation. They argue that in￿ ation is mainly a forward-looking
phenomenon, ￿nding roughly 2=3 of rational and 1=3 of rule-of-thumb price setters from their GMM
estimation. Opposite is the view of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Fuhrer (2000), who, conversely,
obtain in￿ ation as purely backward-looking. The opinions in the middle are innumerable.
Together with the source of persistence in in￿ ation, another key issue lies in understanding
whether in￿ ation persistence is an intrinsic characteristic of industrialized economies. Recent stud-
ies trying to shed light on this issue are Cogley and Sargent (2005), who ￿nd evidence of a structural
break in in￿ ation dynamics, Levin and Piger (2002), who analyzing a panel of industrial countries
conclude that high inertia is not an inherent characteristic of industrial economies, and Erceg and
Levin (2003), who also oppose the view of in￿ ation persistence as structural and argue that it can
depend on central bank￿ s perceived credibility. Reis and Pivetta (2003), on the other hand, ￿nd
that in￿ ation persistence has remained high and substantially unchanged since 1965.
This paper tries to take a di⁄erent route, by suggesting a plausible di⁄erent source of in￿ a-
tion inertia. The paper highlights the potential for adaptive learning in creating persistence in
in￿ ation and tries to evaluate empirically its importance.
Following a growing literature on learning in macroeconomics, I model private agents as econo-
metricians, who estimate simple models of the economy and form expectations from them. As
agents obtain more data over time, they update their parameter estimates by Constant-Gain Learn-
ing (CGL). After learning is introduced, it becomes interesting to examine if structural forms of
persistence, in￿ ation indexation in this case, remain essential to match the data as they were under
rational expectations. One possible way to proceed to evaluate the empirical importance of learning
would consist of simulating the economy with non-fully rational expectations and assess if those
are able to generate enough persistence compared to the data. This paper instead proposes a dif-
ferent experiment: I develop an optimizing model where I introduce learning, but I also allow for a
structural characteristic that induces persistence in in￿ ation. In fact, I allow for indexation to past
in￿ ation by non-optimizing ￿rms. The model therefore nests two potential sources of persistenceADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 3
in in￿ ation: learning and indexation. It becomes an empirical matter to understand whether once
learning is introduced, structural sources of persistence remain essential to match the data.
A related work is Ball (2000), who similarly focuses on expectations and drops the assumption
of full rationality. Ball allows agents to use optimal univariate forecast rules as an alternative to
rational or purely backward-looking expectations. The current paper, instead, introduces learning
by agents. Also related are the papers by Roberts (1997, 1998), and Adam and Padula (2003),
who estimate in￿ ation equations using subjective expectations from surveys. This paper provides
a way to model those subjective expectations, hopefully tracking them more closely than rational
expectations would do.
There are other attempts to enrich the models to imply more inertial dynamics. Dotsey and King
(2001), Guerrieri (2005), Driscoll and Holden (2002), Coenen and Levin (2004) propose alternative
adjustments to the model, all with the scope of generating additional persistence, without focusing
on expectations. Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Woodford (2003) are recent in￿ uential studies trying
to explain inertia by agents￿limited ability to update or absorb information.
This paper therefore aims to contribute to the large literature on in￿ ation dynamics, proposing
and evaluating a di⁄erent explanation of its persistence. Moreover, the current paper can also be
seen as a contribution to the growing literature on adaptive learning.
The majority of studies in the previous adaptive learning literature, in fact, has been mainly
interested in studying the convergence of models with learning to the rational expectations equilib-
rium. This line of research is comprehensively surveyed in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Similar
scope have the applications in monetary policy models, such as Bullard and Mitra (2002), Evans
and Honkapohja (2003).
Recently, this area of research has expanded its objectives, starting to apply learning in order
to explain US in￿ ation in the 70s (Sargent (1999), Orphanides and Williams (2003), Bullard and
Eusepi (2003), Primiceri (2003)) and to examine the empirical importance of learning (Williams
(2003)). This paper shares the interest in these new objectives and contributes to the understanding
of the empirical implications of learning.
By estimating a model with deviations from rational expectations, this paper represents a
simple example of what Ireland (2003) has de￿ned ￿Irrational Expectations Econometrics￿ . Ireland
pointed out the results obtained by the theoretical literature on learning and emphasized the need
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the empirical importance of learning. This is what the paper tries to do. This paper focuses on
single equation estimation, while a companion paper, Milani (2004b), pursues a joint estimation of
a full New-Keynesian macro-model with learning by likelihood-based Bayesian methods.
The paper focuses on the in￿ ation equation. The aim is to see how much persistence can be
explained by learning. I discover this by looking at the estimates for the degree of indexation to
past in￿ ation, necessary to match the data. In models with rational expectations, the coe¢ cient
on indexation has been ￿xed (CEE) or estimated (Boivin and Giannoni (2003) and Giannoni and
Woodford (2003)) to be equal to 1, or typically with quite large coe¢ cients.
The empirical results highlight the unimportance of forms of structural persistence in in￿ ation.
When I drop the assumption of rational expectations, allowing instead economic agents to form their
expectations through constant-gain learning, the estimates of the degree of indexation to lagged
in￿ ation fall to 0. This suggests that learning can account for a sizeable amount of persistence in
in￿ ation.
As a related issue, I recognize that when modeling learning behavior, researchers dispose of
a number of degrees of freedom. An important choice is the learning speed of private agents,
i.e. the value to assign to the constant gain parameter. The results can dramatically change for
di⁄erent assumptions about the learning speed. This is certainly a concern, also in my context.
This concern leads me to perform an additional experiment: I examine the relationship between
the implied estimates of structural persistence and the possible learning speeds. The estimates vary
a great deal across a large range of gain values. It becomes therefore necessary to compare the
di⁄erent possible gains and I will try to shed some light on this by comparing the ￿t of the various
gain coe¢ cients. In this way, I obtain the value of the best-￿tting constant gain coe¢ cient in the
sample. This is close to values typically assumed (without estimation) in the previous learning
literature. I also consider the evolution of the gain coe¢ cient over time and I ￿nd that the best-
￿tting constant gain has been much larger in the post-1982 sample compared with the best-￿tting
gain in the pre-1979 sample, indicating faster learning in the latest two decades.
The ￿nding that in￿ ation persistence is not due to structural characteristics, but to learning
behavior by agents carries some important policy implications. The welfare loss will be di⁄erent
under the alternative sources of persistence and, consequently, optimal monetary policy will be
di⁄erent. A successful management of expectations as called for by Woodford (2001) will be crucial.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model, starting from theADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 5
microfoundations of a dynamic optimizing general equilibrium (DGE) model under rational expec-
tations. Section 3 presents the aggregate law of motion for in￿ ation and describes the expectations￿
formation mechanism. Section 4 derives the main empirical results of the paper. Section 5 and 6
explore the relationship between learning speed and the implied estimated in￿ ation persistence and
in-sample ￿t. Section 7 discusses the policy implications of the results. Section 8 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
In this section, I derive the law of motion for in￿ ation, which will correspond to the popular
New Keynesian Phillips curve, but augmented along two directions. First, to induce a more realistic
degree of inertia in in￿ ation, I allow non-optimizing ￿rms to update their prices through indexation
to lagged in￿ ation, as proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). Then, the paper
makes an important departure from the usual expectations formation mechanism. I drop the
assumption of rational expectations and assume instead that agents behave as econometricians,
estimating an economic model and from that model forming their expectations.
In what follows, I start by setting up the optimal price-setting problem for a ￿rm under rational
expectations. I shall introduce subjective (possibly non-rational) expectations and learning in the
next section. The current paper focuses only on the price-setting problem by ￿rms. A full model
with consumer optimization and monetary policy is described in Milani (2004b).
2.1. The Household Problem
I consider a standard economy populated by a continuum of households indexed by i, maximiz-
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where ￿ represents the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erentiated goods. From the household￿ s
problem, I just need to derive the marginal utility of real income (here equal to the marginal utility of
consumption, the usual ￿t = UC(Ci
T;;￿T)), which will appear in the aggregate supply relationship.
The other details of consumer optimization can therefore remain implicit in the background1.
2.2. Optimal Price Setting
Let￿ s consider the ￿rm￿ s problem. I assume Calvo price-setting, so that a fraction 0 < 1￿￿ < 1
of prices are allowed to change in a given period and are optimally set. The price of the remaining
fraction ￿, that is not optimally ￿xed in the period, is adjusted according to the indexation rule
logpt(i) = logpt￿1(i) + ￿￿t￿1 (4)
Similarly to Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2004) and Giannoni
and Woodford (2003), I allow ￿rms to index their prices to past in￿ ation when they cannot set their
prices optimally. This extension is typically needed to improve the empirical ￿t of the model and
it allows one to derive more realistic impulse response functions. 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 represents the degree
of indexation to past in￿ ation (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) assumed ￿ = 1, meaning
full indexation). An alternative solution to introduce dependence on lagged in￿ ation would consist
of assuming a fraction of rule-of-thumb ￿rms. An example is Gali￿and Gertler (1999), who de￿ne
the derived equation ￿ New Hybrid Phillips Curve￿ .















is the aggregate output, Pt is the aggregate price as in (3). Each
￿rm i has a production technology yt(i) = Atf (ht(i)), where At is an exogenous technology shock,
ht(i) is labor input and the function f (￿) satis￿es the usual Inada conditions.
Since each ￿rm faces the same demand function (5), all ￿rms allowed to change their price in
period t will set the same price p￿


















where Qt;T = ￿T￿t Pt
PT
Uc(YT;￿T)
Uc(Yt;￿t) is the stochastic discount factor (Uc is the marginal utility of an
additional unity of income), and ￿i
T (￿) denotes ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts. Firms discount future pro￿ts at rate ￿,
since they can expect the optimal price chosen at date t to apply in period T with probability ￿T￿t.
The ￿rm chooses fpt (i)g to maximize the ￿ ux of pro￿ts (6), for given fYT;PT;wT(j);AT;Qt;Tg for
T ￿ t and j 2 [0;1].
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where ￿ = ￿=(￿ ￿ 1), s(￿) is ￿rm i￿ s real marginal cost function in period T ￿ t, given price b p￿
t(i),
set in t.


























(! + ￿￿1)xT + ￿￿ (b ￿T+1 ￿ ￿b ￿T)
￿
(9)
where ! > 0 is the elasticity of ￿rm i￿ s real marginal cost function s(￿) with respect to its output
yt(i), ￿ ￿ ￿Uc=(UccC) is the usual intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and ￿ ^￿denotes log
deviations from the steady state3.
From a log-linear approximation of the aggregate price index, notice that b p￿
t = ￿
(1￿￿) (￿t ￿ ￿￿t￿1),
which plugged in the previous expression gives:




T￿t [￿￿￿xT+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e ￿T+1] (10)
where
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(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
￿ > 0 (12)
and ￿ ￿ (!+￿￿1)
1+!￿ . Equation (10) can be quasi-di⁄erenced to obtain a relationship between current
and one-period-ahead expected in￿ ation
￿t ￿ ￿￿t￿1 = ￿xt + ￿Et [￿t+1 ￿ ￿￿t] + ut (13)
where I have added an exogenous cost-push shock ut. A recent strand of literature (Gali￿and Gertler
(1999), Sbordone (2003)) suggests using the real marginal cost as the driving variable for in￿ ation,
instead of the more commonly used output gap. As discussed in Woodford (2003), the relationship
between in￿ ation and marginal costs holds under weaker assumptions. In fact, when the marginal
cost replaces the output gap there is no need to assume any speci￿c theory of wage-setting, for
example.
Therefore, the relationship (13) can be re-expressed in terms of the real marginal cost st:
￿t ￿ ￿￿t￿1 =
(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
st + ￿Et [￿t+1 ￿ ￿￿t] + ut (14)
Notice that I could have derived similar equations for in￿ ation dynamics, only with di⁄erent
restrictions on the parameters, assuming the existence of some rule-of-thumb ￿rms (Gali￿ and
Gertler (1999), Amato and Laubach (2003)), instead of indexation. The results in the following of
the paper are not dependent on this choice.
3. INFLATION DYNAMICS WITH LEARNING
The aggregate dynamics for in￿ ation in the model is given by eq. (13). I now relax the strong
informational assumptions characterizing ￿rms￿knowledge under rational expectations. In this
section, I assume that ￿rms have subjective (and possibly non-rational) expectations. Subjective
expectations are denoted by b Et.4 The law of motion for in￿ ation under subjective expectations
becomes
￿t ￿ ￿￿t￿1 = ￿xt + ￿ b Et [￿t+1 ￿ ￿￿t] + ut (15)










xt + ut (16)
Under this speci￿cation, ￿rms need to forecast future in￿ ation rates to determine current in￿ a-
tion. The next paragraph will give some details about how agents form such forecasts.ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 9
3.1. Expectations Formation: Adaptive Learning
Firms do not know the correct model of in￿ ation dynamics. They behave as econometricians,
estimating an economic model and forming expectations from that model. For simplicity, I assume
that ￿rms estimate a simple linear univariate AR(1) model to form their forecasts of in￿ ation:
￿t = ￿0;t + ￿1;t￿t￿1 + "t (17)
In the estimation, they exploit the entire history of available data up to period t, f1;￿t￿1g
t￿1
0 .
Eq. (17) is called the ￿Perceived Law Motion￿or PLM of the agents. Notice that, although in
the estimation I will use demeaned variables, I recognize that agents need to estimate an intercept
as well as slope parameters. A strictly positive intercept on in￿ ation would signal that agents
expect a positive target for in￿ ation in the sample.
As new data become available, agents update their estimates according to the Constant-Gain
learning (CLG) formula
b ￿t = b ￿t￿1 + ￿R￿1
t￿1Xt(￿t ￿ X0
tb ￿t￿1) (18)
Rt = Rt￿1 + ￿(Xt￿1X0
t￿1 ￿ Rt￿1) (19)




over time, and the second shows the evolution of Rt, the matrix of second moments of the stacked
regressors Xt ￿ f1;￿t￿1g
t￿1
0 . The constant gain is expressed by parameter ￿ and, compared with
the recursive least squares (RLS) gain (equal to t￿1), it represents a simple way to model learning
of an agent concerned about potential structural breaks at unknown dates. Constant-gain learning
has also been de￿ned as ￿ perpetual￿learning, since learning will take place forever and the system
will not converge to the RE solution (but at most to a stochastic distribution around it). A larger ￿
would imply faster learning of structural breaks, but it would also lead to higher volatility around
the steady state. An appealing feature of this framework is that it embeds the standard rational
expectations hypothesis as a special limiting case, i.e. the case for the gain coe¢ cient ￿ converging
to 0. An increasing number of papers has used constant-gain learning (Orphanides and Williams
2003, 2004, Primiceri 2003).
I assume that agents, when forming expectations in period t, have access to information only up
to t ￿ 1: I therefore replace b Et with b Et￿1. Using their PLM and the updated parameter estimatesADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 10
b ￿t, agents form expectations for t + 1 as






To summarize, the model of the economy is composed by the in￿ ation dynamics equation (16)
(Phillips curve), agents￿beliefs (17), updating equations (18), (19), and the forecasting rule (20).
Substituting agents￿expectations formed from their PLM as in (20) into the in￿ ation dynamics
equation (16), I derive the ￿Actual Law of Motion￿or ALM of the economy, i.e. the law of














xt + ut (21)
where the reduced-form coe¢ cients are time-varying and are convolutions of the structural para-
meters describing in￿ ation dynamics and of the coe¢ cients representing agents￿beliefs. In models
with adaptive learning, it is commonly assumed that, in each period t, agents use an econometric
model to form their expectations about future in￿ ation, but they do not take into account their sub-
sequent updating in periods T > t. Therefore, they act as adaptive decision-makers, in accordance
with what Kreps (1998) de￿nes as an anticipated utility model5.
Obviously, although there is just one form of full rationality, several alternative ways to model
learning are possible. The paper considers a simple learning rule (assuming that agents use uni-
variate autoregressive models). But it is worth pointing out that such a simple mechanism of ex-
pectations formation ￿ts quite well with in￿ ation expectations from surveys, such as the expected
in￿ ation series from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, for example.
3.1.1. Is the Expectations Formation Realistic?
The assumed mechanism of expectations formation is not just a theoretical possibility. As de-
scribed in Brayton et al. (1997), in fact, the most recent Federal Reserve model, the FRB/WORLD,
also employs non-fully rational expectations.
Recognizing the uncertainty surrounding expectations formation, the main Fed model not only
uses model consistent rational expectations, but it also models expectations as derived from a VAR
for ￿ve ￿ core￿macro variables (federal funds rate, CPI in￿ ation, output gap, long-run in￿ ation
expectations and long-run interest rate expectations). The underlying justi￿cation is that the
agents understand the main features of the economy, as represented by small economic models,ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 11
and use this information to form their expectations. The Fed model, however, does not currently
incorporate time-variation in the parameters.
Also the realism of forming expectations by adaptive learning can be gauged by looking at
survey-based expectations. Considering in￿ ation expectations from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters, it is possible to notice that these are very similar to expectations derived according
to the adaptive learning algorithm. Less successful in tracking survey-based forecasts are purely
adaptive (na￿ve) expectations and RE (since the data display large and persistent forecast errors,
which are not consistent with RE). A substantial literature, in fact, emphasizes how survey ex-
pectations re￿ ect an intermediate degree of rationality, rejecting full rationality as well completely
na￿vetØ (see Roberts 1998 for example).
Adam (2005) provides some experimental evidence on the formation of in￿ ation expectations,
showing that forecast rules in which agents condition on lagged in￿ ation successfully mimic the
in￿ ation expectations of the subjects in his experiment.
Moreover, learning with a constant gain, useful to account for unknown structural breaks, seems
a plausible choice to model the behavior of professional forecasters. Branch and Evans (2005) show
that constant gain models of learning ￿t forecasts from surveys better than other methods for both
in￿ ation and output growth. They ￿nd that constant-gain learning models dominate models with
optimal constant gain (obtained by minimizing the forecasts￿Mean Square Error), with Kalman
Filter, and with Recursive Least Squares learning. Their results therefore support constant-gain
learning as a model of actual expectations formation.
3.2. Real Marginal Cost as the Driving Variable
Following recent research (Gali￿and Gertler (1999), Sbordone (2003)), I also experiment the
real marginal cost as the relevant driving variable for in￿ ation
￿t ￿ ￿￿t￿1 =
(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
st + ￿Et [￿t+1 ￿ ￿￿t] + ut (22)








(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 + ￿￿)
st + ut (23)
As in the previous case, I assume the same PLM for ￿rms, i.e. ￿rms form their expectations by
estimating an AR(1) speci￿cation for in￿ ation as in (16).ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 12












(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 + ￿￿)
st + ut (24)
4. SOME SIMPLE IRRATIONAL EXPECTATIONS ECONOMETRICS: EMPIRI-
CAL RESULTS
I can now estimate the in￿ ation equation, assuming that ￿rms form expectations and update
their beliefs through constant-gain learning as described. I use quarterly U.S. data on in￿ ation,
output, and real marginal costs from 1960:01 to 2003:04. In￿ ation is de￿ned as the annualized
quarterly rate of change of the GDP Implicit Price De￿ ator, the output gap as detrended GDP
after removing a quadratic trend, the real marginal cost as the unit labor cost, which is empirically
proxied by the log labor income share in deviation from the steady state. All data are taken from
FRED, the database of the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis. I allow agents to initialize their
estimates of coe¢ cients, variances, and covariances, using pre-sample data from 1951 to 1959.
The empirical exercise proceeds as follows. First, I estimate the agents￿PLM allowing them
to learn the forecasting coe¢ cients over time through constant-gain learning, as neatly described
by expressions (18) and (19). Then, I substitute the resulting forecasts into the original in￿ ation
equations, (16) and (22). I initially ￿x the constant gain ￿ at the value of 0:015. This is consistent
with values derived by minimizing the deviation of the constructed series from the expected in￿ ation
series from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, as found by Orphanides and Williams (2004).
I can then simply estimate the ALM for in￿ ation by NLLS (Nonlinear Least Squares). In this
way, I am able to disentangle the e⁄ects of learning from the e⁄ects due to structural sources
of persistence in in￿ ation, such as price indexation. Notice that having explicitly modelled the
formation of agents expectations, it is not necessary to estimate the in￿ ation equation by GMM
as under RE, therefore avoiding the criticism that such procedure has received for Phillips curve
estimation (LindØ 2002, Jondeau and Le Bihan 2003, Fuhrer and Olivei 2004).
This paper therefore focuses on a single equation estimation of in￿ ation dynamics. This ap-
proach avoids infecting the in￿ ation equation by potential misspeci￿cations in other parts of the
model. In a companion paper (Milani (2004b)) I jointly estimate, instead, a full New-Keynesian
model with learning by likelihood-based Bayesian methods. The two papers represent di⁄erent
thought experiments: this paper is implicitly assuming that agents￿learning is correctly modeledADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 13
and it focuses on estimating structural parameters given the assumed learning speci￿cation. Milani
(2004b) pushes the experiment a step further and aims to jointly extrapolate from the data the
learning rule coe¢ cients together with the structural coe¢ cients. In that way, agents￿beliefs and
their learning speed are jointly estimated together with the rest of the model. Structural estimates
will be a⁄ected by the uncertainty concerning agents￿learning speci￿cation. This allows for a
better account of total uncertainty in the system. The drawback is that misspeci￿cations in the
learning equation will bias the rest of the model coe¢ cients. The current paper instead separately
estimates the learning equation; when the results are inserted in the ALM, they are treated as
certain. Therefore, the standard errors of the structural coe¢ cients are likely to underestimate the
true underlying uncertainty.
These papers provide a ￿rst example of what Ireland (2003) has de￿ned ￿Irrational Expectations
Econometrics￿ , judging it needed to complement the mainly theoretical results of the previous
adaptive learning literature.
4.1. What Creates Persistence in In￿ation?
The in￿ ation equation is quite general, allowing for both indexation by ￿rms and non-rational
expectations. Whether the persistence in in￿ ation is structural or due to learning behavior becomes
then an empirical question. Understanding the sources of persistence is crucial and the results can
a⁄ect the recommendations for optimal monetary policy.
4.1.1. Agents￿Beliefs
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the estimated coe¢ cients in the agents￿forecasting equation
(agents￿PLM). Economic agents are updating the coe¢ cients through CGL. The reported evolution
of beliefs is obtained assuming a constant gain equal to 0:015.
In the beginning of the sample, agents were coming from periods of low and volatile in￿ ation
(the 1950s and 1960s), and, consequently, they estimated low autoregressive coe¢ cients for in￿ ation
(around 0:15 at the beginning of the sample). In the 1970s, in￿ ation rose substantially and also
became more persistent. Agents recognized the shift and in the 1970s they start estimating much
larger autoregressive coe¢ cients (with a pick around 1975, where the estimated ￿1;t went up to
0:958). The estimates of perceived in￿ ation persistence declined in the last part of the sample,
though remaining above 0:8.ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 14
The evolution of the intercept in the in￿ ation equation (recalling that the true value should
always be 0, being the variables demeaned) indicates that the perceived in￿ ation target was low
in the 1960s, increased and remained high through the second half of the 1970s, and constantly
decreased after the Volcker￿ s disin￿ ation.
4.1.2. Structural Estimates
Table 1 shows the estimation results. The table reports the estimates for the alternative speci-
￿cations with the output gap and the real marginal cost as main driving variables for the dynamics
of in￿ ation, and for di⁄erent values of the constant-gain coe¢ cient (￿ = 0:015, 0:02, and 0:03).
I obtain coe¢ cients on indexation to lagged in￿ ation, ￿, equal to 0:139 and 0:047 in the output
gap and real marginal cost equations, for the case with ￿ = 0:015. The estimates are small and
not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0. I estimate ￿, the sensitivity of in￿ ation to changes in the output
gap, equal to 0:22. In the equation with real marginal costs as the driving variable, it is possible to
obtain an estimate of ￿, the Calvo parameter. I estimate ￿ = 0:671, indicating prices that remain
￿xed for 3:04 quarters. With other gain coe¢ cients, the results still indicate the unimportance of
in￿ ation indexation (I obtain ￿ equal to ￿0:001 and 0:045 when ￿ = 0:02, and ￿ equal to ￿0:18
and ￿0:09 when ￿ = 0:03). The results about indexation contrast with the estimates typically
computed in the literature.
Likewise, I can estimate a reduced form equation for in￿ ation, given by
￿t = !b￿t￿1 + !f b Et￿t+1 + ￿yt + "t (25)
where yt = xt;st. This is similar to reduced forms usually estimated in the empirical literature (the
New Hybrid Phillips curve for example) and the only di⁄erence comes from the use of subjective





b Et￿t+1 + 0:201
(0:037)






b Et￿t+1 + 0:147
(0:029)
st +b "t (27)
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4.1.3. Comparison with the Literature
Let￿ s compare ￿, the estimated degree of indexation to past in￿ ation, with other estimates in
the literature. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) do not actually estimate ￿, but they ￿x
it to 1, indicating full indexation. Boivin and Giannoni (2003) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003),
working with the same model of this paper, but with rational expectations instead of learning (in a
fully speci￿ed model), estimate a coe¢ cient of ￿ equal to 1. These results point towards extremely
high levels of structural persistence in in￿ ation.6.
Therefore, estimates of ￿ close to 1 hinge somewhat on the assumption of rational expectations.
When this assumption is weakened, by introducing small deviations from full rationality and al-
lowing agents to learn over time, the degree of in￿ ation persistence due to structural features of
the economy can drop to almost zero.
There has been a considerable debate in the literature on whether in￿ ation is mainly a backward
or forward-looking phenomenon. Gali￿and Gertler (1999) stress the importance of forward-looking
expectations in their New Hybrid Phillips Curve (NHPC), although still obtaining a positive weight
on lagged in￿ ation. Fuhrer (1995), on the other hand, depicts in￿ ation as substantially backward-
looking.
The results of this paper give merit to both ideas. In fact, I obtain that in￿ ation is mostly
forward-looking (and indeed very forward-looking as seen in eq. (26) and (27)). If expectations are
formed as in this paper, however, the reduced form will be equivalent to a completely backward-
looking speci￿cation. The e⁄ort to explicitly model subjective expectations gives a way to dis-
entangle the persistence due to structural characteristics from those due to the sluggishness of
forward-looking expectations (this is extremely hard with RE, or even impossible, see Farmer
(2004)). It seems easy to understand, though, why many contrasting results in the literature have
emerged disputing the relative importance of backward and forward-looking terms.
5. LEARNING SPEED AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE
In the estimation, I have experimented di⁄erent gain coe¢ cients between 0:015 and 0:03.
Such values are common in empirical studies adopting constant-gain learning, as Orphanides and
Williams (2003) for example. The degree of persistence introduced in the system by learning, as
well as the estimates of the indexation parameter, are likely to be strongly dependent on the choiceADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 16
of the gain parameter.
For this reason, it becomes essential to investigate how the estimates of structural persistence
vary across a wide range of possible gain values. This experiment allows me to examine the
relationship between learning speed and in￿ ation persistence.
Figure 2 shows such a relationship. The ￿gure illustrates how the reduced form coe¢ cient on
lagged in￿ ation (
￿
(1+￿￿)) varies with di⁄erent gain values ranging from 0 (which is the limit case
corresponding to RE) to 0:30 (the results for values above 0:30 are totally similar to those on that
upper bound).
There seems to be a sort of V-shaped relationship. With a zero gain (or very small gains) the
weight given to lagged in￿ ation in an equation like (26) is sizeable. With slightly larger gains, the
implied coe¢ cients on the backward-looking term becomes much smaller and implies coe¢ cients
below 0:2 for gains around 0:025. Inside this range, learning is successful in creating enough
persistence in in￿ ation, so that no role remains for additional sources of structural persistence.
Outside that range, for lower or larger gain values, backward-looking components and indexation
remain important, since learning with those gains does not generate expectations of future in￿ ation
rates that seem supported by the data.
6. LEARNING SPEED AND FIT
Having such a diverse range of results, it is important to evaluate which value of the constant
gain is more supported by the data. This information is attained by estimating the following simple
equation
￿t = ￿yt + ￿ b Et￿t+1 + ut, where yt = xt;st (28)
over the range of all possible gain coe¢ cients from 0 to 0:30 and evaluating how the in-sample ￿t
changes. It is assumed again that agents form expectations estimating autoregressive speci￿cations
for in￿ ation and updating the coe¢ cients over time through constant-gain learning. As a measure
of ￿t, I report the Schwartz￿ s Bayesian information Criterion (BIC).
Figure 3 indicates how the ￿t (BIC) varies across the whole range of assumed gain coe¢ cients.
Again, it is possible to observe a sort of V-shaped relationship. The best-￿tting speci￿cations
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(with between 0:015 and 0:03). Very small gains (close to 0) and large gains (above 0:06) perform
very poorly in terms of in-sample ￿t.
Table 2 reports the gain coe¢ cients in correspondence of which the lowest BIC is derived. The
best-￿tting constant gain coe¢ cient equals 0:02 for the in￿ ation equation with the output gap
as driving variable. Such a value is similar to what found by Orphanides and Williams (2004)
minimizing deviations of their model-based expectations from data on survey-based expectations.
The results are similar if real marginal costs variable replace the output gap as the driving variable
for in￿ ation. The best-￿tting constant gain coe¢ cient, reported in table 2, now equals 0:025. Figure
7 also illustrates a similar relationship between constant gain and ￿t.
6.1. Learning Speed: Pre-1979 and Post-1982 Samples
So far, we have derived the value of the constant gain coe¢ cient that seems to give the best
in-sample performance for the whole 1960-2004 estimated sample. It is interesting, however, to
split the sample and assess if the speed at which agents were learning have been substantially
di⁄erent over time. The pre-1979 sub-sample has been described as a period characterized by a
passive and destabilizing monetary policy rule by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), who instead
found an active and stabilizing monetary policy rule after 1982. Other papers support the view
of two di⁄erent policy regimes in the pre-1979 and post-1982 periods. Also the 1960s and 1970s
have been characterized by high-volatillity shocks, whereas the 1980s and 1990s have been hit by
more modest shocks: researchers refer to this decline in macroeconomic volatility as ￿the great
moderation￿ . Being the economic environments di⁄erent in the two sub-samples, it is also possible
that agents￿learning speeds have been di⁄erent.
Figure 4 and 5 show the ￿t of the in￿ ation equation (28) across the whole range of values of the
constant gain coe¢ cient for the pre-1979 and post-1982 samples. The best-￿tting gains are also
reported in table 2. The results for the pre-1979 sample are similar to those for the full sample. The
best-￿tting gain coe¢ cient in the pre-1979 sample is estimated at 0:019. Figure 5 instead highlights
how much larger gains are preferred by the data in the Volcker-Greenspan period. The best-￿tting
gain in the post-1982 sample is, in fact, equal to 0:122.7 Learning seems to have been much faster
in the 1980s and 1990s compared to the previous decades. To facilitate intuition, the gain can be
interpreted as an indication of the number of observations agents use to form their expectations. A
gain equal to 0:019 indicates that agents use roughly 13 years of data (52:6 quarters), whereas a gainADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 18
equal to 0:122 indicates that agents use 2 years (8:2 quarters) of data to form their expectations.
Similar results are obtained estimating the in￿ ation equation with real marginal costs replacing the
output gap. The best-￿tting constant gains assume value 0:0245 in the pre-1979 sample and 0:124
in the post-1982 sample. Figure 8 and 9 also depict a similar relation between learning speed and
￿t across the two sub-samples.
This section has provided some evidence that the speed of learning of agents has importantly
changed over time. It would be interesting to study how di⁄erent learning speeds depend on or
a⁄ect monetary policy or the level of macroeconomic volatility. Those would be useful extensions,
but beyond the scope of the paper.
7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Understanding the main sources of in￿ ation persistence is also fundamental for policy. Whether
the inertia in in￿ ation is structural or instead due to the way agents form their expectations has
non-trivial implications for the optimal monetary policy. If frictions, introduced in the models to
improve their empirical performance, turn out to be the wrong representation of the economy, then
a welfare analysis based on such microfoundations will be erroneous as well.
7.1. Optimal Monetary Policy with Structural In￿ation Persistence
Suppose ￿rst that in￿ ation depends on its lagged values because of automatic indexation by
￿rms. Suppose expectations are fully rational. In this case, the rigidity of prices is due to structural
characteristics of the economy.
The optimal monetary policy in the case of indexation, considering a microfounded DSGE model
as in Woodford (2003), could be implemented by a central bank minimizing a welfare-based loss





Lt = (￿t ￿ ￿￿t￿1)
2 + ￿x (xt ￿ x￿) 2 (30)
where ￿x = ￿
￿ under this paper￿ s microfoundations, and x￿ > 0 is the optimal output gap level,
which depends on microeconomic distortions such as the degree of market power and the size of
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This loss function is derived from the microfoundations of the model. It is therefore optimal
not just to minimize the deviation of in￿ ation from target (assumed equal 0 here), but also the
rate of change. The more persistent is in￿ ation, the more aggressive is the optimal reaction of
monetary policy. Optimal policy under commitment from the timeless perspective will satisfy the
target criterion
￿t ￿ ￿￿t￿1 = ￿
￿x
￿
(xt ￿ xt￿1) (31)
The optimal rule would be given
it =  ￿￿t￿1 +  xxt￿1 +  uut + rn
t (32)
where  ￿,  x,  u are feedback coe¢ cients. Monetary policy therefore responds to past observable
variables and current shocks.
7.2. Optimal Monetary Policy with Adaptive Learning
On the other hand, suppose that the persistence in in￿ ation is not caused by structural features
(assuming ￿ ￿ 0), but it is instead due to learning by economic agents. In this case, if the central
bank recognizes this, it would not be optimal to react so aggressively to in￿ ation as if ￿ was close
to 1. But it would become optimal, instead, to react to private sector expectations of in￿ ation.
This would avoid ￿ uctuations induced by mistaken expectations, not in line with the in￿ ation
target. The central bank would in fact want to avoid ￿ uctuations that become unmoored from
policy objectives. Let￿ s consider the following New-Keynesian model with learning, also described
in Evans and Honkapohja (2003), Preston (2003), and Milani (2004b)
￿t = ￿xt + ￿ b Et￿t+1 + ut (33)
xt = b Etxt+1 ￿ ￿
￿




where I have added an aggregate demand equation, and where ￿ represents the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution, it is the policy instrument, and rn
t represents the natural real rate of
interest. The central bank will now target the more familiar
Lt = ￿2
t + ￿x (xt ￿ x￿) 2 (35)
leading to an optimal target criterion similar to (31), but with ￿ = 0.ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 20
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The implied reaction function makes clear the need for the central bank to respond now to expec-
tations of the relevant variables. Expectations are taken as given by the policymaker, who does
not incorporate the agents￿learning rule in its optimization problem. Hence, I abstract here from
issues of active experimentation. In this way, the optimal target criterion is satis￿ed regardless of
the particular expectations held by private agents.
In such a framework, a fundamental task of the central bank and optimal monetary policy
becomes the management of expectations, as emphasized by Woodford (2003).
In order to keep in￿ ation expectations close to target, the importance of transparency and
credibility should be emphasized. In particular, if the monetary authority lacks credibility, every
attempt to reduce in￿ ation, not believed by the public, may be useless and in￿ ation may just
continue to rise for a long time. Bad policy therefore in this new framework can mean unsuccessful
management of expectations and can arise also in the case of a central bank following a truly optimal
rule derived from dynamic optimization. The undesirable outcome of policy in such a case would
be due to an important misspeci￿cation of the policymaker￿ s model: the failure to understand and
incorporate the way agents form their expectations.
Since an important concern in monetary policy points towards robustness of a chosen policy rule,
it would also be necessary to examine the e⁄ects of optimal rules under learning, if the policymaker
does not recognize the true agents￿PLM or assumes that they form expectations rationally. Preston
(2003) shows that price-level targeting is more robust than in￿ ation targeting if the policymaker
wrongly assumes that agents have RE rather than recognizing their learning rule. Similarly, it
would be important to evaluate the losses of optimal policy if the policymaker thinks persistence
as structural whereas it is due to learning and vice versa. Coenen (2003) shows the potential high
losses of underestimating the degree of in￿ ation persistence and calls for aggressive policy as a
safety net. Certainly, if we are willing to believe that bounded-rational expectations and learning
behavior are important determinants of in￿ ation dynamics, new venues of research about optimal
monetary policy open. The robustness of optimal rules not only to standard model uncertainty,
but also to uncertainty in the correct speci￿cation of the agents￿learning rule (dropping RE opensADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 21
a wide range of di⁄erent alternatives), would be an important matter. Indeed, in real world policy-
making, central banks would hardly argue to target loss functions as (30), which include the rate
of change, besides the level, of in￿ ation; policymakers put a lot of e⁄ort instead on monitoring
the evolution of private sector expectations. This is more consistent with models where learning is
important than with models with structural persistence.
8. CONCLUSIONS
Several papers have studied the determinants of in￿ ation dynamics. Monetary policy models
often include a law of motion for in￿ ation in which current in￿ ation depends on future expected
in￿ ation and current output gap or marginal costs. Such a relationship, to which researchers refer
as New Keynesian Phillips curve, can be derived from the optimizing behavior of ￿rms in models
with imperfect competition and sticky prices. Firms, in those models, have rational expectations.
In their simplest form, New Keynesian Phillips curves fail to match the persistence characterizing
actual data on in￿ ation. Therefore, researchers have proposed various extensions that lead to
persistence in the in￿ ation equation. Rule-of-thumb behavior, price indexation, menu costs are
popular modeling devices to account for in￿ ation inertia.
This paper has suggested a di⁄erent approach, proposing learning as an important determinant
of in￿ ation behavior. In the model, economic agents form expectations from simple economic mod-
els, not knowing the true model parameters. They have the same knowledge that econometricians
would have, and, therefore, they use historical data to infer the relevant parameters and update
their estimates through constant-gain learning.
The paper shows that when learning replaces the standard assumption of rational expectations,
structural sources of persistence, such as indexation, are no longer essential to ￿t the data. There-
fore, learning seems to be a major source of persistence in in￿ ation. Disentangling the role of
learning from that of structural sources of persistence carries also normative implications. If learn-
ing rather than mechanical indexation is the main source of persistence in in￿ ation, the implied
optimal monetary policy will be di⁄erent.
Under constant-gain learning, one￿ s results can heavily depend on the choice of the gain. In the
paper, I have shown how the estimated backward-lookingness in in￿ ation varies over the range of
possible gain coe¢ cients. The large di⁄erences are evidence that working with estimated, ratherADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 22
than arbitrarily chosen, constant gain coe¢ cients is necessary. The paper has provided some
preliminary evidence, calculating the best-￿tting constant gain and showing how the ￿t of the
in￿ ation equation changes across the range of assumed gains. The best-￿tting gain for the full
sample considered in the paper seems to be around 0:02, not far from values used by other studies
in the learning literature. The estimated learning speed, however, has been far from constant:
the best-￿tting constant gain has increased from values around 0:02 in the pre-1979 sample to
values around 0:12 in the post-1982 sample, indicating a substantial increase in the speed at which
economic agents are learning. The causes and consequences of the variation in learning speed need
to be studied in future work.ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 23
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Table 1 - Estimates Model with Learning. Equations estimated by NLS.
Output gap as driving variable Marg. cost as driving variable
Full-sample Pre-1979 Post-1982 Full-sample Pre-1979 Post-1982
Constant-Gain ￿ 0:02 0:019 0:122 0:025 0:0245 0:124
Table 2 - Best ￿tting constant-gain coe¢ cient ￿. Note: the estimated equation is
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Figure 1 - Evolution of agents￿beliefs over time.ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 28










































Figure 2 - Estimate of structural persistence parameter across constant gain coe¢ cient values ￿
(in￿ ation equation with output gap).

















Figure 3 - Fit across constant gain coe¢ cient values ￿ (in￿ ation equation with output gap). Fit is
measured by BIC.ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 29






















Figure 4 - Fit across constant gain coe¢ cient values ￿: pre-1979 sample (in￿ ation equation with
output gap).






















Figure 5 - Fit across constant gain coe¢ cient values ￿: post-1982 sample (in￿ ation equation with
output gap).ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 30








































Figure 6 - Estimate of structural persistence parameter across constant gain coe¢ cient values ￿
(in￿ ation equation with marg. cost).





















Figure 7 - Fit across constant gain coe¢ cient values ￿ (in￿ ation equation with marg. cost).ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 31




















Figure 8 - Fit across constant gain coe¢ cient values ￿: pre-1979 sample (in￿ ation equation with
marg. cost).














Figure 9 - Fit across constant gain coe¢ cient values ￿: post-1982 sample (in￿ ation equation with
marg. cost).ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 32
Notes
1The full consumer maximization problem with learning is described in companion papers (Mi-
lani 2004a,b), which also examine time non-separable preferences.
2Consistently with most of the New Keynesian literature I log-linearize around a zero steady-
state for in￿ ation. I am therefore abstracting from the complications arising from log-linearizing
around a positive in￿ ation steady-state. For an account of the possible implications of this choice,
see Kiley (2004) and Ascari (2004). Indexation permits to avoid the problems due to trend in￿ ation,
as shown in the appendix A of Ascari (2004). However, the present paper works with partial
indexation, remaining partly vulnerable to such problems.
3I will omit ￿ ^￿from the following section to save some notation. I also omit ￿ i￿as a superscript
to indicate the i-th ￿rm, being the problem identical for every ￿rm.
4For a di⁄erent approach of considering learning, see Preston (2003), where learning is introduced
directly from the primitive assumptions of multi-period decision problems. The derived law of
motion for in￿ ation will be equal to (10). My choice is instead similar to most papers in the
adaptive learning literature (Evans and Honkapohja 2001, 2003, Bullard and Mitra 2002, Bullard
and Eusepi 2003, and Williams 2003 are examples). See Milani (2004b) for estimations considering
both approaches.
5According to an anticipated utility model, each period agents maximize their expected utility
taking their beliefs and the model as constant, although the model is recursively estimated. How-
ever, when more data become available, agents update their beliefs and use this new knowledge
to maximize expected utility. Agents are therefore learning, but they are not involved in active
experimentation as a fully rational behavior would imply.
6Notice that estimates of ￿ close to 1 imply reduced-form coe¢ cients on the backward-looking
term for in￿ ation only around 0:5.
7This is obtained by using the estimated mean and variances of beliefs up to 1982:IV as initial
conditions for the post-1982 learning algorithm. The experiment therefore refers to the case ofADAPTIVE LEARNING AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE 33
agents that learn at the speed estimated in table 2 until the end of 1982 and then switch to the
new speed constant gain afterwards.